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The looming superpower rivalry between the US and China has massive
implications for Germany and its European partners. While Donald Trump is
forcing Europeans to think outside the transatlantic box, it is Xi Jinping who is
posing more fundamental challenges. Time to balance China’s in uence in a
reasonable way may be running out.
Three key areas to watch.
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The looming rivalry between the US and China is changing the world order and has
massive implications for Germany and its European partners. German chancellor
Angela Merkel has reportedly named China’s rising in uence a key challenge in
global affairs. Europe is trying to  nd strategies to balance Beijing’s growing power,
without alienating it.
Focus
Chinese investments in Europe have become the primary focus of efforts to control
China’s in uence. EU-Lawmakers are currently  nalizing legislation that would give
national governments more discretion to review Chinese investments. However, this
can at best be a defensive strategy and European initiatives to support innovation
and a more pro-active industrial policy should be on the agenda as well.
Forecast
The more assertive China acts on the world stage, the more pressure the US will feel
to counter China’s rise. The Trump administration can be expected to continue
 irting with the danger of escalating one of the existing tensions, be it North Korea,
the South China Sea or a trade war. But for the time being, China will not be provoked
into an open con ict and instead try to push its own agenda.
Information
The relationship between the US and China is an equation with many unknowns.
China’s 19. Party Congress has once again demonstrated how little we know about
the inner workings of the Communist Party. Increasing restrictions on independent
reporting and research in China make it dif cult to assess political, economic and
social developments. Chaos in the Trump administration is greatly adding to the
uncertainties in US-China relations.
Options
European governments and companies need to develop strategies for cultivating
good relations with the United States on the one side and China on the other – while
retaining strategic neutrality in both directions. The multilateral, rules-based world
order that Europeans hope for is under pressure. For Europe to play any signi cant
role in the future world order, it has to act as one.
Where would Germany stand if forced to choose sides in an open con ict
between the US and China? This was a question Bertelsmann Stiftung
discussed in spring 2017 with groups of decision makers from German and
European politics, business and think-tanks. Donald Trump had just been
inaugurated and it was easy to imagine how the US and China might steer into
a confrontation, be it political, economic, military or a mix of all.
Working through various scenarios left participants alarmed as much as
frustrated. Obviously, any movement in Sino-American relations will also
impact Europe. However, there is little that Europe can do to in uence the
relationship between the world's two most powerful nations, and it cannot rely
on being able to maintain strategic neutrality towards both sides. While
political decision makers tended to stick to the transatlantic alliance, business
representatives felt a stronger pull towards China with its still high economic
growth. And while all agreed on a need for greater European unity, few were
willing to put a bet on it. If push comes to shove, will leaders in European
capitals be able to agree on a common position? Or will Europe get stuck in the
middle between the two superpowers?
A year later, the course of events has shown that - unfortunately - these
questions were not a vain intellectual exercise. The US and China are currently
gearing up for what could (or could not - who knows, these days?) escalate into
a global trade war, in which economically everyone would lose, even though
some may claim political victories.
Nevertheless, from a European perspective, the situation looks grim, but not
hopeless. For many, this past year of looming crisis has been a wake-up call.
Across the board, leaders in politics and business have embarked on a process
of reconsidering positions in a rapidly changing global environment. While it is
currently the US that has its  nger on the trigger of disrupting the global order,
China is driving the more fundamental long-term changes. And unlike
Washington, Beijing has recently sent clear signals about its plans for the
coming years.
China has used every stage at its disposal to display its growing global
ambitions, be it at the 19. Party Congress in late 2017, the National People's
Congress in March 2018, the Belt and Road Summit, the World Internet
Conference or most recently the Boao Forum. Under Xi Jinping, China  nally
appears to feel self-con dent enough to be a key player in re-de ning spheres
of geopolitical in uence and the rules of global governance as well as becoming
a world leader in strategic industries and technologies.
Many in the West see this as an open challenge, made possible sooner than
expected by the global power vacuum or confusion that is the Trump
administration. In rhetoric, China maintains its dedication to a multilateral
world order, continued reform and opening up of its markets and a level playing
 eld for businesses. But many of its actions now point in a different direction,
as documented by numerous reports, such as from the European Chamber of
Commerce, various think-tanks and international media. China now seems to
be putting a strong bet on its ability to set its own standards, both economically
and politically.
Surely, China's outside projections may look more impressive than many of its
internal realities. After all, China's domestic challenges remain enormous, be
they economic, social, environmental or even political. Nevertheless, Germany
and other European countries now acknowledge that a core belief about the
direction in which China is moving can no longer be upheld: China seems to
have left the course towards more openness, market oriented reforms and
eventually maybe even some kind of political renewal. (While it may seem
absurd today that this was once expected, let's not forget that until a few years
ago, it was mainstream thinking even in Chinese policy circles. Xi Jinping's new
era never was - or is - China's only option.).
Instead of waiting for eventual convergence, German policy makers are now
gearing up for what some have begun to call a "competition of systems". The
term may be overblown. After all, China is not exporting a political system, but
business opportunities and real-political options, many of which appear
particularly attractive to populist or autocratic leaders. But the challenge is
obvious: Europe will have to  nd a way to balance China's in uence.
Balancing China does not at all mean containing China, as some in Beijing fear
and claim. China cannot and should not be contained. Building a strong
partnership with China and supporting the country's increasing integration into
the global system - both economically and politically - remains the primary
objective. But Europe has a strong interest in  ghting against the erosion of
open markets, a level playing  eld for businesses and a multilateral, rules-
based global order. Without signi cant counter weight in the form of alliances,
regulations and political or economic initiatives, it would be naïve to expect
that Germany or other European countries could remain at eye-level with an
increasingly assertive China. From a European perspective, balancing China
must be an attempt to keep the playing  eld as level as possible, with China as
one of its most important players.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel is reported to have named China's rising
in uence as the key challenge in global affairs for her  nal years in of ce. It will
be a rough ride, with uncertain outcomes. But some contours how Germany and
other European governments are trying to balance China are already emerging.
Three areas that will be at the centre of attention are Chinese investments,
China's cyber security policies and the Belt and Road Initiative. In any of these
areas, the time to come up with reasonable policies and agreements is limited.
Chinese investments
Chinese investments in Europe have become the primary focus of efforts to
control China's in uence. Supporters of stricter investment screening claim
that the EU is currently allowing China to take its liberal system for a ride.
Concerns include that Chinese investors may bene t from Chinese subsidies
that put them at an unfair advantage, or that they may be acting on behalf of
Beijing to seek control of strategic technologies, such as the ten areas de ned
in its "Made in China 2025" strategy. Adding to the tensions is a striking lack of
reciprocity, with China keeping many key sectors off limits for foreign
investors.
Mostly at the initiative of the German, French and Italian governments,
lawmakers in Brussels are currently  nalizing legislation that will give national
governments more discretion to review and authorize Chinese investments.
Speci c measures, their effectiveness and broader implications are currently
topic of heated debates.
Whatever the technicalities designed to control investments, they will have to
cater to differing political realities. Countries like Germany want to have the
possibility to protect Germany's high-tech industries from takeovers that seem
to undermine the strength of the overall economy, while other countries, in
particular in Eastern Europe, are much keener to attract Chinese investment.
In any case, investment controls can at best be a defensive strategy. After all,
any investment regulation runs counter to European beliefs in free and open
markets. Sceptics warn that attempts to "out-Chinese the Chinese" are doomed
to fail. Monitoring Chinese investment  ows may be able to protect some key
industries for a certain time. But it does little to reverse the trend that the
most dynamic markets for many European companies are increasingly in Asia.
Likewise, investment controls do not help much in promoting innovation.
To actually balance China's - legitimate! - attempts at becoming a world leader
in strategic industries and controlling important value chains, European
governments will therefore have to do much more in terms of supporting
innovation and possibly come up with a more pro-active industrial policy.
Cyber Security
Xi Jinping has spent much of his  rst term as President (and General Secretary
of the Communist Party, arguably the more in uential of his positions) with re-
af rming the power of the Communist Party. This included ensuring control of
all information  ows on the internet. New laws on what China calls "cyber
security" now demand that foreign enterprises store all data from their
activities in China on Chinese servers, where protection of sensitive data
cannot be taken for granted.
It were not the laws alone that concerned many European companies and
diplomats, but also the lack of transparency with which the new guidelines
were implemented. On April 1. China was set to enforce rules that forbid the
use of unregistered VPNs, a technology that allows users to access sites that
are blocked in China. VPNs are a means for many foreign companies in China to
communicate with their headquarters without making it too easy for outsiders
to hack into the conversation. They are also a way for foreigners (and many
Chinese) to access services such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Youtube or
Whatsapp. Foreign companies complained that enacting these rules would
dramatically hurt their business. Despite months of intense diplomatic efforts
to  nd a solution, China didn't offer much beyond VPN services from China's
state owned telecom operators. These would be much more expensive than
existing services by international providers and allow authorities to monitor all
data  ows.
A month later, the VPN ban still remains to be fully enforced. For the time being,
many of the channels that companies previously used remain accessible. But
much trust has been lost - and concerns are rising about Chinas next, even
broader policy for enforcing the Party's control over its people. It has been
announced that in 2020, the so-called social credit score system will be rolled
out nationwide. While details of the system are still subject to much
speculation, it can be expected to be dystopian by the standards of Western
societies that attribute high value to the rights of individuals. The reach of the
system may extend well beyond China's borders.
Whatever the limitations of China's control mechanisms, they probably won't
be of technical nature. China appears to be on the forefront of developing
digital technologies and arti cial intelligence. European policy makers are only
beginning to acknowledge that the regulatory challenges posed by the internet
era come from China as much as from Silicon Valley. Europe's new laws on data
protection are a positive  rst step (and in light of the latest data security
scandals not as bad an idea as its critics claim). Rewriting competition laws for
the digital age will be a next and even more ambitious initiative. With respect
to China's ICT giants such as Huawei, Alibaba or Tencent, a next step might be
to establish a rule of reciprocity, demanding that similar cyber security rules as
in China might apply in Europe.
Belt and Road Initiative
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is Xi Jinping's strategy for de ning China's
role on the global stage, promising investment and economic cooperation to
basically any country willing to subscribe to Beijing's grand vision. Over the
last years, winning support for BRI has been a main task for Chinese diplomats
around the world.
Despite initial support, European governments have growing reservations. In
April, a leaked report by European ambassadors in Beijing delivered a scathing
criticism of BRI. All European ambassadors - with the notable exception of
Hungary - had signed the report. While acknowledging that the initiative had
the potential to spread growth and prosperity, in reality it mainly serves
China's geopolitical interests.
Germany's new coalition agreement therefore explicitly calls for a "European
answer" to China's so-called New Silkroad. This may include stronger European
investment and forming new alliances to counter China's geopolitical advances.
At the same time, Germany will have to maintain a constructive dialogue with
Beijing and avoid outright confrontation. After all, major German companies
with high stakes in the Chinese market are eager to demonstrate their support
for Belt and Road (In fact, they have no other choice but to do so if they want to
stay in business.).
European diplomats will therefore have to perform the balancing act of taking
China up on its rhetoric to make the BRI a truly multilateral initiative and at
the same time establishing alternative alliances. One option could be reaching
out to the so-called QUAD countries Japan, US, Australia and India. Similarly,
the Japanese concept of a "Free and Open Indo-Paci c" could serve as a
counter narrative to BRI by offering developing countries in Asia infrastructure
and  nancing at better conditions. Forming such an alliance will not be easy, and
for the time being, Beijing has a long head start. But only with a credible
alternative may China be persuaded to level the playing  eld along the Belt
and Road.
Time for reasonable solutions may be
running out
Germany and many other European economies have been major bene ciaries
of China's economic rise. But the relationship is set to become more complex. A
lot is at stake - for all sides.
A look at the relationship between the US and China may give us some
indication what may be coming. For American politicians, Republicans and
Democrats alike, China has become a key adversary. Using China as a
scapegoat for America's woes has worked all too well.
In Germany and most other European countries, the discussion is still much
more sober. This is a good thing because it gives policy makers a chance to
come up with strategies and policies without the need to constantly signal how
they are being "tough on China". It would be desirable for things to stay this
way, but we shouldn't rely on it. Discussions will heat up. Concerns about
China's political in uence and so-called "sharp power", that have received a lot
of attention in Australia and the US, are reaching Europe. They lead to a
necessary, but also much more public and confrontational discourse.
Likewise, high-pro le investments by Chinese companies in prominent
European companies may also have the potential to tip the scale. In Germany,
the Chinese carmaker Geely recently made headlines by becoming the largest
shareholder in Daimler. The announcement came as a surprise and kicked off
speculations about Geely's intentions. It is easy to make the case why it might
make sense for Geely to take control of Daimler: getting access to all its
technologies, know-how and one of the most valuable brands in the world.
What would happen, if one of the brands that is a symbol of Germany's
economic strength (and often enough: Germany's superiority complex) where
to become Chinese? In any case, it wouldn't make efforts to  nd reasonable
solutions for bringing the Chinese-German partnership back on track any
easier.
But even though bilateral partnerships will remain important: In the long run,
European countries will only be able to balance China's in uence by acting
together. Among the many good reasons for strengthening the EU, the
imminent shifts in the global order may be among the most compelling. As a
whole, Europe still is the world's largest economy and enjoys some of the
highest living standards on the planet. This makes for collective bargaining
power and attractiveness that no single country could bring to the table on its
own.
China is well aware of this and tries to play European countries against each
other, e.g. by launching the 16+1 format. European diplomats have reacted by
demanding that China respect the "One Europe Principle" as much as it expects
other countries to respect the "One China Principle". This has raised eyebrows
in Beijing. It is up to Europe to show that this was not only a rhetorical move,
but that its unity can be reckoned with.
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